On Sun, 31 Aug 2008 04:36:18 +0200 (CEST), Athol wrote:
> What the Australian Privacy Foundation thinks of it:
> http://www.privacy.org.au/Papers/ANPR-0803.html
And for those not bothering to follow the link, the important bits are
here:
5. As commonly practised, and as supported by currently available
technologies, ANPR represents a gross privacy intrusion, and in some
jurisdictions breaches privacy law, in the following ways:
* it involves arbitrary collection of personal data not for a
specific, defined purpose to which it is clearly relevant, but
opportunistically and for vague purposes
* it generates a very large database of personal data, containing:
o registration data
o one set ? but very probably multiple sets ? of:
+ the date and time of sighting
+ the location
+ the direction of movement
* the database can be used to draw inferences and generate
suspicions
* the database is a 'honeypot' that attracts attention from many
organisations for many purposes, resulting in 'scope creep'
* the database is impossible to protect against unauthorised access,
resulting in leakage of content
6. As commonly practised, and as supported by currently available
technologies, ANPR is a mass surveillance technique and breaches the
human right of liberty of movement (UDHR 13.1, ICCPR 12.1). More
specifically, with conventional ANPR:
* an unknown proportion of the large data-holdings is unreliable,
and there is no simple or inexpensive way of sifting the accurate from
the inaccurate
* suspicions can be readily generated, some of which are reasonable
and some of which are not, and there is no simple or inexpensive way of
sifting the reasonable from the unreasonable
* embarrassment is created for law-abiding citizens who are
intercepted on the basis of incorrect data and unreasonable suspicion
* danger is created for law-abiding citizens who are intercepted by
a law enforcement officer who has been given wrong information about the
possible dangerousness of the vehicle's occupants
* the deterrent effect on miscreants appears unlikely to be all that
great
* the unjustified chilling effect on law-abiding citizens appears
likely to be much greater than the deterrent effect on miscreants. This
applies especially to the many categories of persons at risk, including
victims of domestic violence, protected witnesses, celebrities, and
undercover law enforcement operatives
7. The practice of ANPR can readily become arbitrary interference by law
enforcement officers, in such ways as the following:
* undue interception of false-positives
* misunderstandings, unpleasantness and altercations between
officers and vehicle-occupants
* further actions in relation to the intercepted vehicle, such as
roadworthiness inspections, bookings for minor transgressions (e.g.
broken light-covers and mirrors), and search on the off-chance of
finding infringing materials such as drugs
* further actions in relation to the driver, such as delay,
questioning and search
* further actions in relation to other vehicle occupants, such as
delay, questioning and search
8. The effects of the practice of ANPR on the public reputation of law
enforcement agencies and individuals can be positive, in that they will
be seen to be active, and to be effective; but run a great risk of being
seriously negative, in that they will be seen to be intrusive into the
activities of law-abiding citizens, and a key part of a 'police state'
apparatus that gathers vast quantities of information about people's
movements.
9. An alternative approach to ANPR addresses many of these issues. The
'blacklist in camera' design involves:
* release from the on-site camera device of only those detections
that match to the current 'blacklist' of registration plates that are
being sought
* certified non-accessibility and non-recording of any personal data
other than that arising under the above circumstances
* substantial controls over the download of the blacklist to the
device and the maintenance of the blacklist
* substantial controls over the quality of data used to prepare the
blacklist, and exclusion of sources of data that are of insufficient
quality
10. Considerable commitment and investment are required in order to
implement the alternative approach to ANPR in the face of the momentum
that has been achieved in some countries overseas by the orthodox,
grossly privacy-invasive form of ANPR.
11. It is vital that ANPR projects be conducted in a transparent manner,
including published information, consultation, privacy impact
assessment, and published results.
12. It is vital that Parliaments expressly preclude inappropriate
designs for uses of ANPR, and expressly authorise appropriate designs
for and uses of it.
5 +1000, OzOne wrote:
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